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Abstract
Albert Einstein is regarded by many as perhaps the 
greatest scientist of the 20th century. Yet, one of his most 
enduring legacies is the monumental debate that he lost 
over the issue of quantum mechanics. Time and again, 
Einstein focused every bit of his extraordinary intellect 
on numerous efforts to undermine quantum mechanics 
only to fail on each and every occasion. While Einstein’s 
reputation among his fellow physicists may have suffered 
as a result, his efforts, nonetheless, did much to advance 
the field of physics—and also, I argue, to sustain a 
commitment to good science.
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INTRODUCTION
For many, it might come as a surprise that Albert Einstein, 
a name that is synonymous with genius, formulated many 
of his greatest scientific breakthroughs while employed 
as a patent clerk (Isaacson, 2007). During his lifetime, 
Einstein became the world’s most recognizable academic, 
but his fabled career got off to a rocky start. As an 
undergraduate, perhaps due to an unshakeable confidence 
in his own intellect, Einstein failed to display the type of 
deference that his professors expected from their students. 
As a result, keen as he was to embark on an academic 
career, none of Einstein’s professors were willing to 
support his bid for graduate studies. Being denied his 
foremost career preference, Einstein was forced to pursue 
other options (Ohanian, 2008).
Following an extended job search, Einstein landed a 
position as a patent clerk. So bleak had his employment 
prospects become that Einstein received news of the 
clerkship with great enthusiasm. Though the Swiss patent 
office was less illustrious than his academic aspirations, 
Einstein found patent work to be a pleasant diversion. 
Also, Einstein’s modest workload left the greater part 
of his mental energies untaxed. As a result, even while 
fulfilling his duties as a patent clerk, Einstein could 
embark on extended contemplations of the most puzzling 
issues in theoretical physics.
So it was that Einstein labored in anonymity until 
1905, Einstein’s annus mirabilis, or his miracle year (Kaku, 
2004). With the publication of four major papers during 
1905, Einstein revolutionized scientific conceptions of 
the physical universe. In the first miracle year paper, 
Einstein argued that rather than flowing in unbroken 
streams, light energy was split into minuscule packets, 
called quanta. In the next paper, Einstein argued that the 
inexplicable Brownian motion of dust motes in fluids 
was due to the impact of particles that were so minute 
(i.e., atoms) few scholars had been willing to believe 
such infinitesimals could exist. In his third miracle year 
paper, Einstein introduced his theory of special relativity: 
a theory postulating that space and time are relative. 
And in the fourth paper, Einstein revealed the scientific 
equation that has come to immortalize his stunning 
theoretical achievements, E=mc2. With this equation, 
Einstein established the fundamental equivalency of 
matter and energy and, what’s more, he drew attention to 
the awesome and terrifying energy locked within atomic 
particles (Rhodes, 1986). 
Though academic physicists might have been inclined 
to sneer, Einstein was fortunate that Max Planck was 
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among the first readers of his revolutionary manuscripts. 
Max Planck, a renowned physicist and the Associate 
Editor of the Annalen der Physik, immediately recognized 
the genius in Einstein’s theoretical inspirations. In part, 
because Einstein drew upon Planck’s groundbreaking 
work in the realm of quantum physics, but also because of 
the sheer brilliance that Einstein exhibited in his articles, 
Planck dutifully published Einstein’s submissions and, as 
a result, the physical universe has never looked the same 
since.
Prior to Einstein, Newtonian mechanics had dominated 
scientific conceptions of the physical universe (Hawking, 
1988). In Newton’s mechanical universe, time and space 
were fixed and believed to be measurable from an absolute 
perspective. In addition, until Einstein’s miracle year, 
physicists had searched in vain for ether, the essential 
substrate of the cosmos. Ether was presumed to exist 
because, since light was understood to behave like a wave, 
Newtonian conceptions of matter and energy asserted that 
waves could only be propagated through a medium. Thus, 
for distant starlight to reach earth, space must be filled 
with ether. The problem was, try as they might, scientists 
were unable to locate the existence of ether. Though 
unthinkable, it almost seemed as if in the deep, dark void 
of space there was no ether.
In Einstein’s universe, ether was not only non-existent, 
but it was unnecessary. Einstein dispensed with this 
key feature of the Newtonian universe by asserting that 
light exhibited properties of both waves and particles. In 
addition, Einstein repudiated Newton’s conviction that 
time and space were fixed by envisioning an entirely new 
convergence of matter and energy. Einstein argued that, 
though the speed of light was always constant, space 
and time could be warped depending upon one’s relative 
velocity. Consequently, all that had once been certain 
in Newton’s mechanical universe had suddenly become 
relative. Einstein had literally redefined the fabric of reality.
1 .   P A R A D I G M  C R I S I S :  F R O M 
N E W T O N I A N  A B S O L U T I S M  T O 
EINSTEINIAN RELATIVISM
Just as many great thinkers had done before, Einstein 
encountered an inescapable dissonance between his 
observations of the empirical universe and established 
scientific theories—in this case, Newtonian mechanics. 
Faced with this dilemma, Einstein drew upon his 
exceptional creativity to construct new theories that would 
render previously inscrutable phenomena intelligible. So, 
like other great thinkers, Einstein stretched the theoretical 
boundaries of his discipline in order to bring scientific 
knowledge into closer accord with the parameters of the 
known universe. In so doing, one could argue that Einstein 
developed a more truthful lens through which to view the 
physical universe.
On the other hand, in sweeping aside Newton’s 
mechanical universe, one could also argue that Einstein 
illustrated that science is a fundamentally relativistic 
endeavor (Ladyman, 2002). In other words, for over 
two hundred years, Newton’s mechanical paradigm had 
represented The Truth about the physical universe. Yet, in 
the short span of his Miracle Year, Einstein undermined 
many of Newton’s key presuppositions. After 1905, there 
was a new standard for determining truth in the cosmos. 
Newton was old news. Essential as such a paradigm shift 
may have been, nevertheless, the transition from Newton’s 
to Einstein’s ideas cast a troubling light on the role of truth 
in science. Essentially, one had to ask, was there anything 
especially truthful about scientific truths? In other words, 
if universal truths are only valid relative to particular 
scientific paradigms and, in turn, if paradigms are fleeting 
and disposable, then do scientific truths represent anything 
more than intellectual fads?
Perhaps the simplest definition of truth is “knowledge 
that unbiased, undistorted, or pristine” (McGettigan, 
2006). Thus, truth can be understood as knowledge 
that describes an unvarying quality of the empirical 
universe. For example, Einstein’s 1905 discourse on the 
photoelectric effect asserts that the most elemental unit 
of luminous energy is a particle-like quantum known as a 
photon. The importance of this or any other statement of 
truth is that, first of all, the statement reveals something 
useful, intelligible and demonstrable about the universe: 
light travels in, and can be measured in photons. Another 
crucial feature of scientific truth is that it must represent 
knowledge that remains valid across time and space. 
Whether on earth, Mars, or in the Andromeda galaxy, 
light must travel in quantum-sized photons. Therefore, 
regardless of the time or place, truth must be universal 
and unvarying.
Getting back to the transition from Newtonian 
mechanics to Einstein’s relativity, one must wonder: if 
science is, first and foremost, an endeavor concerned with 
the pursuit of truth, then how can scientific paradigms 
be disposable? That is, many of the truths touted by 
Newtonian mechanics (e.g., time and space are fixed) 
are, according to the relativity paradigm, demonstrably 
false. Consequently, if the knowledge contained in any 
particular scientific paradigm is demonstrably false, 
then what guarantee is there that the truths touted by any 
paradigm, including Einstein’s relativity perspective, are 
any more reliable? Indeed, critics of science have argued 
that, given the limitations of human cognition and the 
imperfections in the knowledge systems that we create, 
it is simply impossible for science to capture universal, 
unvarying truths (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994; Foucault, 
1980). No matter how earnest scientists may be in their 
pursuit of truth, the limitations on the human ability to 
conceive and represent Ultimate Truth makes it impossible 
to generate knowledge that approximates what is really, 
finally, universally true. Indeed, critics of science have 
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pointed to the common occurrence of paradigm shifts as 
an illustration of this problem: the most fundamental truths 
endorsed by one paradigm (e.g., time and space are fixed, 
or the void of space is filled with ether, or the earth is the 
center of the universe, etc.) are often viewed as examples 
of rustic ignorance by succeeding paradigms. As such, 
critics of science have argued that far from representing 
timeless, transcendent knowledge, any truths that science 
may proclaim are strictly relative to, and delimited by, the 
dominant paradigms of the day (Lemert, 1991). 
2.  REALISM, TRUTH, AND REDEFINED 
REALITIES
It is indisputable that the scientific truths of one era 
often tend to be the butt of jokes in the next. From the 
perspective of the 21st century, it seems laughable that 
anyone could ever have believed that the earth was 
flat (Garwood, 2008), or that it lay at the center of the 
universe. Yet, in spite of the relative impermanency of 
scientific truths, I argue that it is possible to identify 
at least a grain of truth in even in the most antiquated 
scientific paradigms. For example, the ancient Greeks 
believed that the universe was constituted of four basic 
elements: earth, air, fire and water (Bakalis, 2005). Of 
course, contemporary periodic tables illustrate that there 
are far more elemental substances than the ancient Greeks 
could ever have imagined. Nevertheless, were the Greeks 
completely deluded to think that there were only four 
basic elements? In fact, I would argue that the ancient 
Greek paradigm was relatively truthful in that each of 
the four elements manifested demonstrable properties 
of “creation,” e.g., a mixture of water and earth brought 
forth life in farmers’ fields, volcanic fire routinely created 
new land masses, and air was indisputably essential to 
sustain life. Certainly, in the 21st century, we know a 
great deal more about the elemental forces that shape the 
universe, but I think it is still fair to say that the Greeks 
were not delusional when they asserted that the universe 
was constituted of four basic elements. Rather, they were 
merely operating within a paradigm that was designed to 
make sense of the available evidence at the time.
That scientific paradigms are imperfect is not a matter 
of dispute. No matter how cherished, no matter how 
seemingly flawless, no matter how groundbreaking, the 
simple fact is that every scientific paradigm that humans 
have ever invented—or, I would hazard, that humans 
ever will invent—is flawed. This is the case, quite simply, 
because no matter how exacting scientific research may 
be, the human capacity to observe and conceptualize 
truths is limited. The universe is boundless and full of 
surprises, whereas the minds that seek to compass that 
selfsame infinitude are limited and flawed. Thus, scientific 
paradigms can never incorporate the “entire truth.” There 
will always be more to know. If scientists do their work 
properly, scientific paradigms will always be short lived.
That said, I disagree with those who argue that 
science is an utterly relativistic endeavor. In contrast 
with Einstein’s relativity paradigm, relativism is a 
perspective which asserts that all knowledge is equally 
(in) valid. Relativists assert that there is no such thing as 
truth (Seidman, 1991; Richardson, 1998; Clough, 1994). 
Such an assertion is patently false. First of all, it must be 
understood that there is a distinction between truth and 
its subsequent perception and representation by humans. 
Though solipsists would insist otherwise, it is important to 
acknowledge that there is a reality “out there” (Lyng and 
Franks, 2002; Popper, 1983). Just try to deny it the next 
time you bump your head on a tree branch. In brief, Karl 
Popper has noted that such intellectual discord is rooted 
in the fundamental dissonance between realist and idealist 
philosophy. Popper (1983) asserts that realist philosophers 
accept that empirical reality exists independently of the 
perceptions of individual observers. In other words, 
realists believe that there is a real world out there. By 
contrast, idealists argue that reality is only accessible via 
subjective perceptions. As a result, it is impossible to 
demonstrate that anything real, substantive or empirical 
exists outside an observer’s subjective perceptions. In the 
most extreme version of such an idealist perspective, the 
universe is presumed to be nothing more than a figment 
of the imagination of individual observers (Clegg, 2009). 
Interestingly, Einstein’s negative reaction to such a 
perspective in the field of physics led to one of the greatest 
scientific debates in the twentieth century.
3.  QUANTUM ENTANGLEMENT
By building upon Max Planck’s discoveries, Einstein 
pointed the way toward an entirely new intellectual 
frontier in the realm of sub-atomic physics. While 
Einstein devoted the bulk of his attention to developing 
his theory of general relativity, a generation of trailblazing 
young physicists surged into the bizarre landscape 
of quantum physics. Chief among this new breed of 
physicists was Niels Bohr, who established an institute at 
the University of Copenhagen that was entirely devoted 
to the advancement of quantum physics. As Bohr and his 
institute attracted many of the greatest physicists of his 
age, their collaborations ultimately produced what has 
come to be known as the Copenhagen interpretation of 
quantum mechanics. Once established, the Copenhagen 
interpretation became the dominant paradigm in the 
field of quantum physics, but as the details of this new 
theoretical perspective came to light they were greeted 
with deep skepticism by a towering figure in physics, 
none other than Albert Einstein.
Essentially, the Copenhagen interpretation endeavored 
to account for the puzzling duality, or what Bohr would 
later identify as the complementarity, of phenomena at the 
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sub-atomic level. Again, Einstein was among the first to 
recognize such elemental dualities. For example, though 
it seemed to defy reason, Einstein postulated that light 
exhibited qualities of being both a wave and a particle. Up 
to the time of Einstein’s astounding discovery, classical 
physicists were convinced that physical phenomena had 
well-defined, distinct and consistent properties. Thus, 
there had previously been a clear separation between 
matter and energy, electricity and magnetism, time 
and space, particles and waves, etc. However, many of 
Einstein’s breakthroughs revealed that each of these 
phenomena, distinct as they may have seemed, were 
nevertheless, integrally related. Willing as Einstein may 
have been to acknowledge such mind-bending dualisms 
in his own work, he was nonetheless discomfited by the 
conclusions drawn by Bohr and his collaborators about 
quantum phenomena. Early on, the most objectionable 
elements of the Copenhagen interpretation for Einstein 
derived from Heisenberg’s (1930) uncertainty principle.
Heisenberg argued that, from the perspective of 
classical physics (meaning physics before Einstein), 
every object in the universe was presumed to have a 
precise mass and momentum. These facts could easily be 
established through observation: mass and momentum 
could be specified by using straightforward measurement 
procedures. Furthermore, classical physics asserted that 
objects, such as billiard balls, would maintain their mass 
and momentum regardless of whether they were subject to 
direct observation or not. For example, if someone were 
to fire a cannon, though observers might not be able to 
examine the projectile in flight, it would still be possible 
to infer the cannon ball’s trajectory by taking issues such 
as mass, acceleration and gravity into account. The final 
proof of the projectile’s flight could be established by 
traveling to the impact site and recovering the cannon 
ball. Although Heisenberg was willing to concede that the 
above statements were generally true for conventionally 
observable phenomena, Heisenberg asserted that 
everything changed at the level of the quantum.
To begin with, quantum phenomena are not observable 
in the conventional sense. Although we can observe 
billiard balls with our eyes, quantum particles are so 
minute that they defy optical observation. Thus, the 
only way to observe quantum particles is to employ 
measurement techniques that interfere with the particles. 
As a result, Heisenberg argued that precise measures 
of a quantum particle’s position tend to interfere with a 
particle’s momentum, whereas measures of momentum 
tend to modify position. Though the idea initially made 
him squeamish, Heisenberg (1930) concluded that the 
exactitude of classical physics must yield to uncertainty 
in the quantum realm: it is impossible to determine both 
the precise momentum and position of quantum particles. 
In turn, as Bohr expanded upon Heisenberg’s uncertainty 
principle, the Copenhagen interpretation opened a chasmic 
philosophical divide in the physics community.
At the 1927 Solvay Conference, Bohr unveiled his 
full-blown theory of quantum mechanics. Bohr introduced 
this radical new perspective by making the relatively 
banal assertion that the only way to establish a quantum 
object’s characteristics (e.g., position vs. momentum, or 
wave vs. particle) was to make observations. However, 
according to Bohr’s (1928) quantum postulate, in every 
case, the act of observation modified the dualistic 
characteristics of the quantum phenomenon in question. 
Put somewhat differently, Bohr argued that there was no 
clear separation between observers and the phenomena 
that they observed. As such, Bohr added that there was 
no longer any way to assert the unequivocal existence 
of objective reality, “ . . . an independent reality in the 
ordinary physical sense can neither be ascribed to the 
phenomenon nor to the agencies of observation” (Bohr, 
1928, p.54). Thus, Bohr asserted that studies which were 
designed to search for the wave-like features of quantum 
particles generally produced results which indicated that 
quantum particles were wave-like. The same was true 
for studies designed to focus on the particle-like qualities 
of quantum phenomena. As a result, Bohr reformulated 
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle to make the more 
outlandish assertion that it was the observation process 
itself that modified quantum phenomena. It was almost 
as if quantum particles somehow “knew” that observers 
were intent upon witnessing a particular type of quantum 
activity and then modified their behavior accordingly. As 
if that weren’t enough, Bohr still had one more nail to 
hammer into the coffin of realism. Bohr’s coup de grace 
was to argue that, because quantum states are dependent 
upon and vary in relation to observation, if a particle is 
not subject to observation then one should not assume that 
it has either position or momentum. Even more, Bohr’s 
newly codified Copenhagen interpretation adopted the 
anti-classical position that, “An unobserved electron does 
not exist” (Kumar, 2008, p.262).
For Einstein, Bohr’s final lurch into solipsism was too 
much to bear. Einstein was convinced that the physical 
universe was more objective, solid and precise than the 
Copenhagen interpretation proposed. Further, Einstein 
believed that the singular purpose of science was to 
unlock the secrets of the physical universe. Years later, 
Einstein affirmed this conviction in a letter to Max Born, 
“You believe in a God who plays dice, and I in complete 
law and order in a world which objectively exists” 
(Kumar, 2008, p.331). In short, Einstein was a realist 
and he insisted that an objective universe must exist 
independently of the cognition of individual observers. 
For example, even though Einstein had not witnessed 
the eclipse that Arthur Eddington used to test his theory 
of relativity, Einstein was convinced that the eclipse had 
actually taken place: the eclipse was a real phenomenon 
in an objective universe that was governed by universal 
physical laws. From Einstein’s perspective, even though 
quantum particles might be substantially smaller than the 
5 Copyright © Canadian Research & Development Center of Sciences and Cultures
Timothy McGettigan  (2013). 
Studies in Sociology of Science, 4(3), 1-9
earth, sun, and moon, nevertheless, quantum particles 
were every bit as real as larger physical objects. Therefore, 
if the earth, sun and moon had identifiable properties of 
position and momentum, then the same also had to be 
true of quantum phenomena. Consequently, Einstein was 
convinced that, if Bohr and his collaborators were not 
able to determine both the position and momentum of 
quantum particles, then quantum mechanics could not 
be a complete theory. Further, when objectively-minded 
physicists decided to develop a complete theory of 
quantum mechanics, Einstein insisted, all that was fuzzy 
in the empirical universe would become crystal clear.
For their part, Bohr, Heisenberg and other supporters 
of the Copenhagen interpretation argued that quantum 
mechanics was a complete theory. In other words, due 
to the essential dualisms that were intrinsic to quantum 
reality, supporters of the Copenhagen interpretation 
argued that quantum mechanics offered as final and 
thorough a statement on the quantum realm as it was 
possible to articulate. Unsatisfied with that response, 
Einstein drew upon his vast intellect to design one 
fiendishly clever thought experiment after another. Each 
of the thought experiments was intended to emphasize the 
incompleteness of the Copenhagen interpretation. Einstein 
was convinced that a more complete theory would surely 
re-introduce sanity into the conceptual morass that was 
quantum physics.
In spite of Einstein’s insistence upon a realistic 
interpretation of quantum mechanics, his primary 
antagonist, Neils Bohr, successfully deflected each 
of Einstein’s conceptual assaults on the Copenhagen 
interpretation. Strangely, the more insistently that Einstein 
defended his realistic principles, the more Einstein came 
to be viewed as a stodgy old has-been. After settling in at 
Princeton University, Einstein confided to Max Born that, 
among his new colleagues, he was “considered an old 
fool” (Born, 2005, p.128)
4.  THE THOUGHT EXPERIMENT FROM 
HELL
Still, Einstein stuck to his guns. Making one last titanic 
effort, and working with two collaborators, Einstein 
designed a thought experiment that even Bohr was never 
able to fully debunk (Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen, 
1935). As noted above, Einstein objected to the quantum-
mechanical notion that, in the absence of measurement, 
particles had neither position nor momentum. Thus, in his 
EPR collaboration, Einstein set out to demonstrate that it 
was possible to determine, whether subject to observation 
or not, particles possessed real physical properties, 
such as position and momentum. Importantly, the EPR 
argument accepted the quantum-mechanical contention 
that it was not possible to specify position and momentum 
simultaneously. Instead, the EPR argument simply 
endeavored to affirm that position and momentum were 
real properties of real particles in an objective reality. If 
the EPR paper could establish that particles were imbued 
with real, identifiable properties for which quantum-
mechanics could not account, then Einstein would 
finally be able to prove that quantum-mechanics was an 
incomplete theory.
Thus, the EPR thought experiment involved two 
particles, or systems that interacted for a period of time 
and then flew off in different directions. Once the particles 
were separated, it would arguably be possible to obtain 
precise measures of particle I without interfering with 
particle II. Einstein insisted that this was the case because 
of a phenomenon that he referred to as locality. In other 
words, Einstein believed that for particles to interact, they 
needed to be in the same vicinity. According to Einstein’s 
concept of locality, once particles have separated, they no 
longer have any direct influence upon each other: after 
separation, modifications to the position or momentum 
of particle I would have no influence on particle II. To 
suggest that separated particles might continue to interact 
would imply that particles were somehow endowed with 
the “spooky” ability to communicate instantaneously 
over great distances. Not only would such bizarre 
interaction defy common sense, but it would also require 
faster than light communication, which would violate 
Einstein’s theory of relativity. Ergo, EPR concluded that 
instantaneous action-at-a-distance was not a reasonable 
feature of reality.
Proceeding from Einstein’s assumptions about 
locality, after particles I and II have become separated, 
any measurement of particle I would presumably have 
zero impact on particle II. Therefore, EPR asserted that, 
equipped with knowledge about the original particle 
interaction, it would be possible to measure particle I’s 
position and then make precise inferences regarding 
particle II’s position. The same would also be true for 
measures of momentum. Certainly, EPR conceded, it 
would not be possible to make precise simultaneous 
measurements of particle I’s position and momentum. 
Nevertheless, EPR asserted that, because quantum 
mechanics asserted that it was possible to establish 
either the precise position or momentum of particle I, 
then it must also be possible to establish that particle II 
possessed those same attributes. As a result, EPR drew the 
conclusion that, even though particle II was unobserved 
(and therefore undisturbed), its position, momentum and 
its very existence were confirmed elements of objective 
reality. Since quantum mechanics denied that unobserved 
particles existed in an objective reality, and therefore 
could not account for such phenomena, EPR concluded 
that quantum mechanics was an incomplete theory.
Upon publication of the EPR paper, Einstein once 
again succeeded in sending shock waves throughout the 
physics community. Although Einstein was perceived 
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by many physicists as a tiresome curmudgeon (Folsing, 
1997, p.699), Bohr approached Einstein’s EPR critique as 
a mind-bending but essential test of quantum mechanics. 
In the end, Bohr replied to Einstein in much the same 
way that Hamlet addressed his naive compadre, Horatio: 
“There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, 
Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.” While Bohr 
was willing to concede that spatially-distant particles 
might not be able to disturb each other mechanically, 
nevertheless, Bohr insisted that the process of observing 
the position or momentum of one particle had what 
he referred to as an “influence on the very conditions 
which define the possible types of predictions regarding 
the further behavior of the system” (Bohr, 1935, p.700, 
italics in original). That is, Bohr believed that particles, 
such as those Einstein described in his EPR thought 
experiment, that interacted at one point in time would 
remain entangled in a single system, and, thus, would 
exert a mysterious but nonetheless instantaneous influence 
on each other even when the particles became distantly 
separated. Again, Bohr linked this type of quantum 
entanglement to observation; arguing, that humans modify 
reality—often in the most puzzling and unexpected 
ways—in the process of observing reality. Thus, Bohr 
rejected the EPR argument on the basis of his quantum 
postulate: for humans, reality does not exist until we find a 
way to observe it, and in the process of observing reality, 
humans invariably modify it. 
To say the least, Einstein was not impressed. He 
and Bohr were clearly at an impasse. More than once, 
Einstein spoke disparagingly of Bohr’s suggestion 
that separated particles could somehow influence 
each other, referring to such quantum entanglement as 
“spooky action at a distance” (Born, 2005). For Einstein, 
the universe was neither the product of individual 
imaginations, nor was it subject to change based upon 
the vagaries of human perception. In short, God did 
not play dice with Einstein’s universe. Einstein was 
convinced that a right-minded God would only create a 
universe that was logically consistent from the behavior 
of the smallest sub-atomic particles to the largest supra-
galactic phenomena. What’s more, God’s version of the 
universe should ring true with Einstein’s expectations 
of reality, or else, Einstein was convinced, there was 
something wrong with reality!
For his part, Bohr was swayed by the troubling, but 
nonetheless, compelling complementarity of quantum 
phenomena. There seemed to be no way around it: at 
the quantum level, the universe was a wacky place. 
Interestingly, as much as Einstein insisted that his was a 
more reasonable, and scientifically orthodox definition 
of the universe, the facts (strange as they were) tended 
to affirm Bohr’s version of quantum mechanics. Again 
and again, experimental results have supported the 
Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. Yet, 
although Einstein grudgingly acknowledged that quantum 
mechanics was the best available theory to explain sub-
atomic physical phenomena (Einstein, 1950), he remained 
insistent that it was an incomplete theory. Einstein and 
Bohr remained conceptually and collegially at loggerheads 
until their final days: Einstein whiled away his final years 
contemplating an elusive unified field theory, while Bohr 
literally drew his last breath while wrestling with one of 
Einstein’s more nettlesome thought experiments (Kumar, 
2008, p.327).
5.  COMPLEMENTARY REALITIES
So, the question remains: Which of these two titans 
of modern science was correct? Certainly, their ideas 
regarding quantum reality were contradictory and 
mutually exclusive. Consequently, in a rational universe, 
one would expect that one of the two, either Bohr or 
Einstein, would have to be correct, while the other was 
demonstrably wrong. However, in the finest tradition 
of quantum complementarity, I believe that, precisely 
because of their irreconcilable differences, Bohr and 
Einstein were each both right and wrong.
Just as quantum particles exhibit dualistic and yet 
complementary characteristics, I believe the same is 
also true for the theories that describe quantum reality. 
Though Einstein and his supporters may have been loath 
to admit it, Bohr’s version of quantum mechanics has 
been supported again and again by scientific observation. 
Irrational as it may seem, quantum particles consistently 
exhibit spooky action at a distance (Clegg, 2006; Kumar, 
2008, p.350). Precisely why such a phenomenon should 
exist remains a mystery, but the accumulated evidence 
of repeated observations is difficult to deny. The act 
of observation seems to influence the phenomena that 
are the subject of observation. While such an idea 
has troubling implications for those who believe in 
an independent, objective reality, Bohr’s quantum 
postulate does expose a fundamental truism about 
science. Knowledge and facts are intellectual constructs: 
we know only those things that our minds are capable 
of perceiving. What humans experience as reality is 
essentially a figment of the imagination. Thus, reality 
may exist out there, but, then again, it may not. However 
unlikely, there is no way to prove that reality is anything 
more than that which the mind perceives. That being 
the case, it stands to reason that, at least on some level, 
phenomena must always be influenced by the processes 
of observation. This is as true for quantum particles as 
it is for human social behavior (Landsberger, 1958). 
Observation influences reality. 
True as that may be, it is still easy to appreciate 
Einstein’s antipathy for quantum mechanics. The idea 
that, on any level, objective reality might not exist 
independently of observation, or that reality might be 
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subject to modification at the whim of observers is 
dissatisfying. Can observers truly exercise so much power 
over the constitution of reality? The idea seems to defy 
common sense. Rather than transforming to comply with 
observers’ hopes and expectations, reality tends to yield 
only grudgingly in the face of individual initiative. For 
example, try as I might, I have never been able to melt 
the frost off of my windshield by dreaming of balmier 
weather. Thus, there is abundant evidence to support faith 
in an observer-independent reality: just because I take 
my eyes off of the sun does not mean that it will cease 
to exist. Whether our name happens to be Horatio or 
not, humans regularly encounter new phenomena that do 
not fit within our current philosophy. Thus, as Einstein 
argued, it is the task of science to explain the endless 
peculiarities of an objective universe over which humans 
have only limited understanding and control. Science is a 
knowledge-seeking enterprise that is forever in a process 
of reinventing itself. Thus, Einstein was actually less 
troubled by the bizarre behavior of quantum particles than 
he was by Bohr and Heisenberg’s suggestion that quantum 
mechanics was a complete theory.
To suggest that quantum mechanics is a complete 
theory is to conclude that science has arrived at the final, 
ultimate truth about quantum reality. Again, due to the 
uncertainty associated with quantum phenomena, Bohr 
and Heisenberg believed that it would never be possible 
to develop more precise knowledge about the quantum 
realm than the Copenhagen interpretation would allow. 
Einstein objected to this conclusion largely because the 
theory of quantum mechanics itself acknowledges that it 
can provide at best an imperfect description of quantum 
phenomena. Thus, Einstein was willing to concede that 
quantum mechanics might be the best available theory to 
describe quantum phenomena, but he felt certain that, due 
to its inherent limitations, quantum mechanics offered by 
no means the final word on quantum reality. If quantum 
mechanics offered an imperfect description of quantum 
reality, then Einstein believed that scientists bore the 
responsibility of developing better theories. Though he 
became an object of ridicule in the physics community—
indeed, Clauser reported that colleagues regularly assured 
him that Einstein’s objections to quantum mechanics 
were evidence that he had gone senile (Bertlmann and 
Zeilinger, 2002, p.72)—Einstein remained adamant that 
scientific journeys did not end with mysteries, rather, he 
insisted that’s where they should begin.
Although I am not a physicist, I support Einstein’s 
principled objection to the idea that quantum mechanics 
is a complete theory. However, my objection does not 
derive from any specific objection to quantum mechanics, 
rather I object on the grounds that any theory that has 
been constructed by imperfect intellects must, by its very 
nature, be imperfect—or, in the language of the EPR 
debate, incomplete. By this, I do not mean to suggest that 
science is an utterly futile endeavor, i.e., since humans 
cannot generate perfect or truthful knowledge, then 
there is no point in even attempting to do so. Far from 
it, I agree with Karl Popper who argued that knowledge 
acquisition is a never-ending process. Whatever we know 
now, regardless of the field of endeavor, is less than we 
can eventually learn and, therefore, represents less than 
we ought to know. As science advances, humans benefit in 
myriad and often unexpected ways. Science is at its best 
when its practitioners assume that all existing knowledge 
is incomplete. Thus, by doubting the completeness of 
quantum mechanics, Einstein was neither deluded nor 
senile, he was simply being a good scientist. Nonetheless, 
all too often, knowledge-seekers who challenge beliefs 
that other scientists hold sacred tend to encounter violent 
opposition rather than collegial encouragement.
Any truth-seeking endeavor will cease and fail at the 
very moment that knowledge-seekers decide that they 
have arrived at final, ultimate truths. This is the case 
because, first of all, it is simply impossible for imperfect 
minds to compass universal, ultimate truths. This point 
is particularly well-illustrated by the fact that earthlings 
currently enjoy only an imperfect understanding of a 
minuscule fraction of the universe (Clegg, 2009; Overbye, 
2006). Perhaps even more problematic: those who 
assume that they have captured final, ultimate truths often 
intentionally close their minds to further inquiry (Popper, 
1957). Thus, not only do true-believers invest faith in 
knowledge that represents anything but the Ultimate 
Truth, but they also refuse to entertain ideas that might 
challenge their preferred assumptions. Nothing could be 
more antithetical to the goals of good science.
Like all creatures, for humans to survive, they must 
adapt. However, human adaptation is tied to pursuing 
problematics that tend to modify the very nature of truth 
and reality. Bohr was right: observers redefine reality—
and often in ways that they might neither choose, nor 
prefer. As Einstein discovered, new truths can often be 
traumatizing, however, the greatest scientists pursue 
the truth no matter where it leads, and no matter what 
the implications might be for their cherished beliefs or 
scholarly reputations. As Popper argued so persuasively, 
solutions are naught but the gateways to new problems 
(Popper, 1965, 1999). Those who are convinced that 
existing knowledge is far from perfect will always be the 
wisest of us all.
6.  (R)EVOLUTIONARY TRUTH
Of necessity, truth must remain an evolving target. 
As the boundaries of the known universe expand, the 
paradigms that extend scientific frontiers must keep 
pace. Humbling though it may be, the surest route to 
scientific progress is to assume that the existing state of 
knowledge is lamentable. Whether we like it or not, the 
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grandest truths that we cling to today will eventually seem 
as quaint as the once firmly held conviction that earth 
was flat. Indeed, the mere suggestion that any scientific 
discipline may be nearing an “ultimate theory” (Greene, 
1999) is exceedingly curious. No scientific discipline can 
brag of greater accomplishments than those achieved by 
physicists. Nevertheless, given that physicists currently 
acknowledge the universe is permeated by vast quantities 
of inscrutable “dark” substances (Panek, 2011), I believe 
it is premature (to say the least) to assert that ultimate 
theories lie just around the corner. In fact, rather that being 
on the verge of an ultimate theory, I would assert that such 
fragmentary conceptualizations of dark matter and energy 
auger an impending paradigm shift of epic proportions. 
When such a paradigm shift inevitably takes place, those 
who have predicted “the end is near” will be wearing egg 
on their faces, however, everyone else will benefit from 
science having taken, yet again, one small (but tantalizing) 
step toward compassing the universe’s far-flung mysteries.
Without doubt, the greatest threat to science is the 
presumption that any particular paradigm might somehow 
encapsulate the final, ultimate Truth. In every case where 
humans have claimed ownership of final truths, agency 
has been forced to cower in the face of bloody-minded 
ideology (Barnett, 2006; Bergin, 2006). If scientists are 
ever unwary enough to presume that their intellectual 
journey has arrived at its final destination, then in that 
very moment science, the quest for knowledge and 
intellectual integrity itself will suffer extinction.
The life of science is necessarily dependent upon an 
enduring commitment to intellectual evolution. That being 
the case, scientists can only preserve their enterprise 
by maintaining a steadfast commitment to agency. In 
other words, scientists must always maintain a stronger 
commitment to their own doubts than the “certainties” 
paradigms tout; scientists must stubbornly seek anomalies 
that, ultimately, are certain to undermine the cherished 
paradigmatic beliefs upon which their careers have been 
founded. This is essential not purely for the purposes of 
tearing down scientific aspirations--as postmodernists 
were wont to do. Rather, the goal of accumulating 
anomalies is to force confrontations between established 
paradigms and the Truths that transcend those paradigms. 
Science is at its best when it remains singularly committed 
to the goal of evolving paradigms and, in so doing, 
focusing scientists’ unwavering aspirations on the Truths 
that extend perpetually beyond their wildest imaginations.
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